This paper deals with the effects of the transfer of additional funds on the real economy of recipient countries, in particular the European Member States. The intended and unintended effects of additional funds on national public finances and, ultimately, economic performance are discussed. Understanding the real effects of additional public funds and the possible complementarity or substitutability with national public finance is important for shaping the policies for the allocation of Structural Funds. Verification of additionality plays a role in ensuring that additional funds are used to effectively complement national expenditure programmes. In the case of the European Union, it is widely recognised that the current verification mechanism is affected by weaknesses, that prevent it from providing reliable and useful data to effectively assess additionality. For this reason, the paper suggests the European Commission to move away from the current verification approach and to adopt a new one that could more effectively assess to what extent the Structural Funds complement national investments.
Introduction
The issue of the net long-run effect of public expenditure is at the core of the current macroeconomic research and debate.
The public authorities are interested in knowing whether public expenditure, especially in the form of public investment, has a positive aggregate effect on growth.
In several cases, countries have the possibility to use not only their own resources to boost the national economy, but also external additional funds, which could potentially complement and increase the total amount of investments, thus enlarging the impact of public investments. Injecting funds into economies is potentially a growth-enhancing intervention in the medium-long run.
However, additional funds may also distort the public authorities' allocation choices, so that an additional euro may not lead to a corresponding one euro increase in the total public expenditure.
This paper deals with the impact of the transfer of additional funds on the real economy of the recipient countries. The role and effects of additional funds are mainly discussed in the framework of the European Union (EU), where the European Commission allocates the Structural Funds (SF) in the Member States' regions. Yet, the effects of additional funds can be researched also in countries with a federal government, characterised by the existence of a higher governmental level distributing funds at regional and local level, and in the context of foreign aid in the Least Developed Countries, which rely on bilateral and multilateral grants to address their relevant investment needs and to stimulate long-run growth.
The allocation choices of the recipient bodies and hence the final effect of additionality are influenced, directly or indirectly, by a number of factors. They relate to: (i) the institutional quality of the recipient country, i.e. the form of government, the effectiveness of the rule of law and the level of corruption; (ii) the kind of political interests in place and the pressure of interest groups and lobbies; (iii) external or internal budgetary restrictions and financial rules. Depending on these factors, the additional funds may be diverted away from their optimal use, i.e. the most growth-enhancing sectors and areas.
The paper suggests the existence of three broad typologies of effects, which may intervene to distort the national allocation choices of the beneficiaries. The three effects are described and tested through an extensive literature review.
The first effect analysed is the substitution effect: it occurs when the public authorities use the received additional resources to substitute, totally or in part, their own finance to planned investments. Supranational funds intended for growthenhancing sectors may in fact act as substitutes for national spending that would have been undertaken in any case. The result would therefore be that the freed up funds could be used for other purposes and the total amount of investment does not correspond to the sum of the national planned expenditure and additional external funds.
Another distorting effect caused by additionality is the displacement effect. If a national government receives additional funds, there might be a shift in the sectoral allocation of domestic public funds with respect to the previous period, and the sectoral composition of public spending may vary.
Finally, additional public investment may determine a fiscal effect in the recipient country. This kind of deviation is expected to affect the taxation system, leading either to a decrease of the tax base, if the additional funds are uncommitted, or to an increase of taxation, when co-funding is required and budgetary restrictions are in place. The literature review's objective is to help in understanding the real effects of additional public funds and the possible complementarity, substitutability or displacement with national public expenditures.
A factor that plays a role in ensuring effective implementation of a programme/project financed with additional external funds, i.e. that that additional funds are used where they are allocated and that no distorting effect take place, is verification.
Effective and well-designed verification procedures could be a valuable instrument to push the recipient country to use additional funds, in order to properly complement national expenditure.
It is widely recognised that the verification mechanism of additionality in the EU is affected by some problems and difficulties. In particular, the heterogeneity of data provided by the Member States and the methodological differences of data collection make difficult to effectively compare the expenditures across different Member States and programming periods and, as a consequence, to analyse the overall effect of additionality. Given these shortcomings, the authors suggest the European Commission to move away from the current verification approach.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the concept of additionality, the areas where this principle is applied and the different factors that may influence the allocation choice and may provoke distorting effects; in Section 3 a literature review on the distorting effects of additionality is carried out, distinguishing among the substitution effects, the displacement effect on the composition of public spending and across different geographical areas, and the effect on taxation; Section 4 describes the verification procedures currently used within the European Union, its weaknesses and the possible solutions to make the verification system more reliable, transparent and straightforward; finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2.
The concept of additionality and the main issues at stake
The effect of public investment and the concept of additionality
All the public authorities are interested in knowing whether public expenditure, especially (but not exclusively) in the form of public investment, has an aggregate effect on growth. This issue is deeply studied in the theoretical and empirical literature examining the macroeconomic effects of public capital expenditure and investment on economic performance and growth, and can be tackled by considering the supply or the demand side of the economy.
In the context of neoclassical contributions, the inclusion of public expenditure (in the form of a flow, as in Barro 1990, or stock as in Futagami et al. 1993) in firms' (and consequently, aggregate) production functions increases the rate of return to private capital thus stimulating private investment and, indirectly, economic growth. The seminal contributions in the neoclassic literature (reviewed by ) focus on investment in education (Lucas, 1988) and productive public capital (especially public infrastructure, Barro 1990) entering directly as inputs in the output production process.
The role of health public expenditure (Bloom et al. 2003) and R&D investment (Romer 1990) , have also been highlighted as possible public capital components that are important driving forces for capital accumulation and, ultimately, long-run growth. In the Lucas (1988) endogenous growth model, investments in human capital generate increasing returns through two mechanisms: on the one hand, they directly contribute to GDP formation; on the other hand, they represent a positive externality which individuals do not fully take into account when deciding how much time to devote to human capital accumulation. Both empirics and theory support the view that education makes individuals more productive, thus further accelerating GDP growth. Moreover, public capital accumulation raises the return of private capital and, consequently, is likely to attract private investments (Aschauer 1989 , Munnell 1990 , Delorme et al. 1999 , Cohen and Paul, 2004 and Erden and Holcombe, 2005 and to obtain greater impacts than what would have been gained with only the private component.
Keynesian models provide a different view on the role of public investment and consumption, analyzing the direct effect on growth by focusing on the demand side and stressing the role of fiscal policies as stabilizers and as a stimulus to economic activity. Blinder and Solow (1973) , by recognizing that nominal wages are fixed, stress the importance of fiscal policy for economic activity through multiplier effects that "crowd in" private investment. The positive relationship between public investments and growth appears to be supported also by the empirical evidence, as shown in Figure 1 , where the share of public investments and an important role in a country's growth path and economic development. In addition to their own resources, many countries have the possibility to use also external additional funds to stimulate the national economy. The mechanism behind the effect of increasing the total amount of investments on economic growth is not straightforward. From one side, additional funds could potentially complement the total amount of investments; from the other side, they may also have distorting effects on the national public finance, so that one additional euro does not correspondingly increase the total public investments.
Three broad typologies of effects intervene to distort the national allocation choices of the beneficiaries. They are the substitution effect, the displacement effect and the effect on taxation.
Areas of applicability of additionality
The role and effects of additional funds can be researched in three frameworks: the European Union, the federal government typology and the foreign aid. The effect of public investment is briefly presented for each of them.
European Union
Within the European Union (EU) framework, additionality is one of the key principles of the Cohesion Policy
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The principle of additionality has been constantly pursued by the Commission since the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. The EU regional policy was supposed to be implemented by funding additional resources to the national ones, without substituting them. At the beginning, the ERDF was managed by the sole Member States that autonomously set the criteria for the eligible areas and the amount of investments, with the Commission having no influence power. As a consequence, the EU funds were mostly used by the Member State to substitute their public finance.
, stating that, in order to achieve a genuine economic impact, the appropriations of the SF in the regions targeted shall not replace public or equivalent expenditure by the Member States, but complement them; put in other words, EU funds are only granted to a Member
State if the latter also contributes. Table 1 shows the total amount of allocated SF in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The average share of funds over GDP was about 0.3%, but for Portugal and Greece this share was much higher (approximately 2%).
In order to make the financing mechanism more effective, in 1979 the Regulation 214/1979 gave the Commission the primary responsibility of EU funds management, with the aim of promoting an effective regional and cohesion policy. In 1988, the principle of additionality was institutionalized and clarified, underlining that the Structural Funds shall not substitute the national public resource addressed to the same objectives. The general rule, demanding that the level of expenditure is at least equal to the amount of average annual expenditure in real terms attained during the previous programming period, aims at avoiding the possibility of substitution effect and at contributing at the creation of greater benefits in terms of growth in the Member States.
Types of expenditures considered eligible to receive EU funds in addition to the national public appropriations are basic infrastructure (transport, telecommunications, energy, water supply, environmental protection and health), human resources (education, training, research and development), productive environment (expenditures to promote activities in the productive sectors, including local economic infrastructures and aid to firms) and other (such as the technical assistance). The largest amount of EU additional investments is directed towards the first two categories. (Bouvet 2007) , are shown to have a positive effect on regional economic performance. Another important issue, which has been raised by several authors, is that SF seem to be more effective in lagging behind regions (Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005, Becker et al. 2008 ) and in those areas characterized by good institutional quality (Ederveen et al. 2006) . A recent contribution by Florio and Moretti (2009) examines the impact of regional SF on industry performance, concluding that the European Cohesion Policy's direct support to businesses might contribute to the process of reallocation of persons employed across industries. Moreover, Hsu et al. (2009) and Luukkonen (2000) highlight the potential for positive effects of EU funds at the firm and national level, with a specific focus on R&D investments, stressing however the importance of evaluation criteria and assessment of results.
Federal and multi-level government
The concept of additionality applies to all the federal states characterised by the existence of a higher governmental level distributing funds at regional and local level . In such a framework, the additional resources potentially play a role in the provision of public goods, but several political variables (see section 2.3) may affect their allocation and actual impact. Moreover, with the presence of different levels of government and spatial disaggregation, potential spillovers of public spending from one region, or jurisdiction, to another may affect the allocation between different sub-national units. The areas that can reap the benefits of local public goods may well be outside the boundaries of the local government having official jurisdiction on the investment and spending decisions for that good, leading to the possibility of free riding behaviours.
Positive spatial spillovers of investment in transport and telecommunication infrastructure may lead to over (or under) estimation of the real impact of public funds and additionality due to the network characteristics of these sectors. Appropriate accounting of this aspect is extremely difficult and it represents a limit to the possibility to assess the real impact of additional public funds.
Foreign aid
Another field where the impact of additionality has been deeply studied is represented by foreign aid and intergovernmental transfers in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The LDCs, which are generally characterized by low international reserves and private investment, rely on bilateral and multilateral aid to address their relevant investment needs and to stimulate long-run growth.
In 2008, the total net Official Development Aid transferred by the donor countries, included the European Commission, to the developing countries amounted at around 140,000 million US dollar (in current prices) 7 ; 3,000 million were transferred as Other
Official Flows, with a minor grant quota 8
The growth-enhancing potential of international aid has been a widely debated topic, leading to complex conclusions. Aid may increase both public and private investment (Feyzioglu et al. 1996 , Agenor 2004 , thus improving the receiving country's economic performance; yet, in a recent review, Ducouliagos and Paldam (2009) conclude that development aid has not been effective in stimulating growth, as also Rajan and Subramanian (2008) pointed out. In fact, in the attempt to explain the effects of foreign aid on the beneficiary's economy, significant and reliable results can be obtained only if other context factors (institutional, political, economical...) are taken into account (see the following section).
. 6 In fact, the European Union could be considered as a peculiar case of quasi-federal government.
7 Source: OECD-DAC website. 8 In 2009 these amounts significantly dropped to 26,000 and 699 million US dollar respectively (preliminary data), because of the world financial crisis.
Factors influencing the allocation choice
A number of factors characterizing the beneficiaries of funds affects, directly or indirectly, their allocation choices, i.e. the occurrence of the three mentioned distorting effects, and the impact of additionality. They relate to the institutional quality, the kind of political interests in place and the existence of budgetary and financial constraints. All these factors are considered throughout the literature review presented in the following sections and are recalled here below to stress their role in the evaluation of the real impact of additionality.
Institutional quality
The literature highlights the importance of the institutional context in guaranteeing that additional funds are directed towards growth-enhancing uses. In the neoclassical literature on the effect of public expenditure, the institutional setting of the recipient country is crucial to shape its development path, as stressed by Acemoglu et. al (2004) and Helpman (2008) .
In the foreign aid framework, good institutional quality, meaning democracy, effective rule of law, governments with longterm vision and low corruption, allow aid to be more effective (Bräutigam 2000, Burnside and Dollar 2000) ; on the contrary, where public institutions are weak and corrupted, the beneficiary is likely to distort money away from the development objectives and towards short-run and recurrent (operating) expenditures (Njeru 2003) .
Political interests
The allocation of additional public funds across sectors and areas may be driven by political factors, such as party composition, interest groups and lobbies, which could direct funds away from their optimal use, because of the existence of powerful private actors influencing the political agenda of public managers.
Singhal (2008) studies the effect of interest groups on the allocation of public funds in a federal context with a model of government contracting between politicians and special interest groups that have the ability to raise funds for the production of a lobby good. The theoretical setting is a stylized dynamic reputation model where, in each period, the government has to decide the amount of spending on the lobby good. Simultaneously, the interest groups have to decide whether to raise funds, knowing that the government can provide payback on the good. The solution to the game implies a positive probability of the government spending more on the lobby good when it receives a grant than if it were to maximize its objective function.
In the multi-level government context, Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) built a political economy model for the allocation of public investment grant on German municipality level data, serving as a framework for comparing the influence of lobbies and interest groups versus the presence of similar political parties at the different levels of government. By modelling the cities' level of additional public investment (in the form of grants from a higher level) as a function of economic conditions, local investment decisions, lobbying variable and political variables, the authors have a testable equation in a simultaneous equation approach. The main result is that the political aspect dominates the presence of interest groups in the allocation of additional public funds, since municipalities ruled by the same party that is in charge of the higher level of government are more successful in attracting grants and funds.
Budgetary constraints
The existence of budgetary restrictions and rules increase the possibility that distorting effects occur when additional funds are allocated. Additional funds for a new investment might entail future current costs that the receiver may or may not be able to commit to, due to budgetary restrictions.
National governments may have internal constraints for public finances that must be met. Ayuso-i-Casalas et al. (2009) distinguish between procedural rules, which govern the national annual budget law, numerical fiscal rules, which imply targets and ceilings for fiscal aggregates and policies, and independent fiscal institutions (other than the Parliament or the government), which provide recommendations on fiscal policy. Arpaia and Turrini (2008) examine fiscal reaction functions and test the assumption that governments decrease public investment in order to consolidate and ameliorate public debt. In the empirical analysis, the authors consider the general aggregate measure of government expenditure, which includes public investment. Results in fact show that the share on GDP of government spending decrease as the ratio debt to GDP falls, corroborating the view that expenditure curbing is used as a measure of fiscal consolidation.
The 27 European Union Member States have also to comply with fiscal restrictions imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which limit de facto their possibilities of spending. Budget constraints revealed to be binding for some EU countries in the early 2000s and even more in these years, due to the effects of the current financial crisis. In these circumstances Member States could use EU funds to substitute their own expenditure, thus reducing the total amount of investments (Bacchiocchi et al. 2009 ).
Apart from under-investment, budget constraints can cause other effects, such as privatisation and decrease of public asset accumulation (Easterly 1999 , Florio 2007 and changes in the composition of domestic demand, by favouring investments in sectors and projects with higher and/or short-term returns (Easterly et al. 2008) .
Like the EU Member States, the LDC may also have financial constraints imposed by the donor. Particular conditions are attached to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s loans and programmes, requiring that the beneficiary country keeps its budget deficit under a certain limit and increases its internal reserves. The fiscal austerity in Latin America during the Eighties and the Nineties determined public investment and infrastructure compression, which led to a decline in infrastructure stock accumulation and output growth (Calderon et al. 2002) . On the other side, Dreher (2006) , moving from Barro and Lee (2005) results, confirms that IMF programmes are likely to reduce growth, at least in the short/medium term, but also finds that compliance with conditionality mitigates such negative effect.
Literature review on the distorting effects of additionality
After having presented the concept of additionality and its possible implications on the economy of the beneficiary, an extensive literature review is provided, to highlight the main theoretical and empirical contributions on additionality and on the possible role of public expenditure. The analysis will be particularly focused on the Cohesion Policy framework and on Structural
Funds, but some reference will be made also to the other contexts where additionality may apply (i.e. multi-level governments and developing countries receiving aid).
The substitution effect
Supranational funds intended for growth-enhancing sectors (such as, for example, education) may in fact act as substitutes for national spending that would have been undertaken in any case. The result would therefore be that the freed up funds could be used for other purposes. Several authors highlight that worldwide transport and communication are sectors generally not fungible (see Devarajan et al. 2008 and Feyzioglu et al. 2011) , whilst investment in the education sector has very little effect on education spending, meaning that this kind of investment is more probably used for other scopes. Another sector which is highly fungible is the health sector (Lu et al. 2010 ).
Budgetary restrictions and financial difficulties, such as those caused by the recent economic crisis, may have strong influence on the degree to which additional funds are used to substitute, rather than complementing, the national planned investments. Bacchiocchi et al. (2009) estimate the effects of debts sustainability and fiscal constraints deriving from the Stability and Growth Pact on government expenditure in fixed capital, education and health in OECD countries. The authors show that, when debt is high, government capital expenditure and education expenditure are significantly reduced in the whole sample, independently of EU membership. Hence, it appears that EU countries have been constrained in their investment decisions more by the need to ensure debt sustainability than by the rules of the Stability Growth Pact. In low debt New Member States (NMS) public investments even increase with the debt ratio, a finding that is reassuring for their growth prospects. However, a less optimistic picture emerges when expenditures in public health and education are considered, as it appears that NMS governments cut such expenditures as the deficit increases, even at low levels of debt. Problems in controlling total expenditure together with the preventive arm of the SGP may have penalized investment in human capital in NMSs while leaving fixed capital investment unaffected. Pereira and Pinho (2006) test in the Euro zone that government expenditure, while causing short run budget deficits, may have a long-run positive effect on growth if the resulting increase in the tax base and revenue is strong enough; they find that public sector investment has indeed a positive effect on long-run growth and thus public-investment spending cuts to comply with current budgetary restrictions and consolidation efforts are at the expenses of long-term economic performance.
In the context of tight fiscal rules and concerns about the capability of governments to pay back their outstanding loans, both at a national and supra-national level, appropriate fiscal targets that go beyond the simple cash deficit criterion may be designed. A recent and critical review of the literature is contained in Serven (2007) . In this contribution, the author argues that different fiscal rules, which take into account the intertemporal dimension of public sector solvency and acknowledge the positive role of productive public investment on growth, may have differential impacts on long-run performance. Mintz and Smart (2006) distinguish between investments that will over time generate revenues for the government (with the underlying assumption that in the long they will run be self-sustainable), from those that finance services that will be offered at no charge. This modified rule takes explicitly into account the possibility that only part of the flow of public expenditure is in the long-run productive, thus representing a possible source of revenue; a logical implication of this view is that in times of tighter budget constraints, productive public expenditure should not be cut as severely as the non productive one. This rule however limits the amount to be borrowed to a fraction of revenue-generating assets.
The displacement effect on the composition of public spending
In this section, the allocative effect of additional (supra-national) funds on national public spending composition is considered. If a national government receives additional funds, there might be a shift in the allocation of domestic public funds with respect to the previous period, and the sectoral composition of public spending may vary.
In a Keynesian framework, additional public funds will have an impact on the multiplier effects of public spending. Censolo and Colombo (2008) consider heterogeneous firms in the imperfect competition model proposed by Chen et al. (2005) and introduce a variety of markets characterized by different degrees of monopoly power. In this setting, the effect of fiscal shocks and the sign and size of the Keynesian multiplier crucially depend on the composition of public expenditure. This is due to the fact that the public sector can modify aggregate demand through the composition of public spending. The analysis is mainly focused on the short run, and the important result is that "a fiscal expansion that reallocates resources towards the monopolistic sector can exert a positive effect on output reducing the misallocation of labour generated by the monopolistic pricing" (Censolo and Colombo 2008, p. 164) .
The authors stress the important role played by government consumption in modifying the economy's composition of aggregate demand.
In a growth framework, public spending enters directly the aggregate production function, and a reallocation of funds will be reflected in different coefficients in the aggregate production function attached to disaggregated public expenditure . Devarajan et al. (1996) consider the share of different components in total government on growth and account for a level effect by controlling for the size of total expenditure on aggregate GDP. With data from 1970 to 1990 for a sample of 43 developing countries , it is shown that current expenditure has positive and significant growth effects while the capital component seems to exert a negative effect. However, when looking at the sub-sample of developed countries, the results are reversed, and the standard finding of a growth enhancing effect of capital public expenditure is retained. This result might rest on the fact that developing countries present several distortions, with high levels of corruption and black market issues, which could make additional expenditure on public capital unproductive. Overall, they conclude that public expenditures labelled as "productive" may become unproductive due to general institutional and economic conditions and in the case of excessive amounts. Bose et al. (2007) The positive externalities associated with public infrastructure have been modelled by introducing public capital in the production function of final output as a complement to private capital (Arrow and Kurz 1970) . Some of the channels through which the positive effect of a well developed infrastructure capital stock influence economic activity and growth are the reduction in transportation and transaction costs, the increased accessibility and attractiveness of regions, allowing a better distribution across space of production activities. Better telecommunication infrastructure facilitates business transactions, lowering production costs and fostering new links and synergies among economic actors. Quality of a country's infrastructure stock is also important in an international context, with positive effects of a country's or region's attractiveness for FDI and openness to trade, through better accessibility to home and foreign markets. Investment in infrastructure may also have positive spillover effects on neighbouring areas and positively affect foreign producers and consumers (Bougheas et al. 2000) , given the public good nature of this form of capital stock.
In a recent World Bank paper (Estache et al. 2007 ) the authors conclude that it is difficult to compare across countries the contribution of different components of productive public capital. Comparing expenditure on health, education and transport, they
show that low-income countries generally lag significantly behind higher-income countries, but also show that efficiency has improved during the 1990s in energy and education but not as much in transport. These results confirm the idea that the effect of reallocating public spending rely heavily on the initial macroeconomic conditions of the country under examination.
Finally, the literature on public choice considers that the allocation of additional public funds across sectors may be driven by the government's optimizing behaviour or can be influenced by political factors. Bradford and Oates (1971) set forth the idea that increases in lump sum intergovernmental transfers initiate a local expenditure response equivalent to an increase in the region's income of the median voter: this is the so-called "fly-paper effect", since the money appear to "sticks where it hits" (Nestbit and Kreft 2009, p. 96) . The underlying idea of Bradford and Oates' model is that the median voter should perceive grants and income as fungible and, as long as the government's decisions reflect the preference of the median voter, additional funds should be spent for public goods in proportion to voters' marginal propensity to spend out of private income. More recently, Knight (2002) develops a model allowing for the endogenous determination of grants and government spending through a legislative bargaining process. The author documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and the preference for public goods. Thus, when the role of interest groups is correctly taken into account, the net effect of grants is to crowd out public spending By focusing on the interaction between special interest groups and the government, Singhal (2008) studies their effect on the allocation of public funds in a federalist context. With a model of government contracting between politicians and special interest groups that have the ability to raise funds for production of a lobby good. The theoretical setting is a stylized dynamic reputation model where, in each period, the government has to decide the amount of spending on the lobby good. Simultaneously, the interest groups have to decide whether to raise funds, knowing that the government can provide payback on the good. The solution to the game implies a positive probability of the government spending more on the lobby good when it receives a grant than if it were to maximize its objective function. Therefore, the presence of special interest groups provides an explanation of the "flypaper effect".
To conclude, this section has shown how the effect of additional public funds on the composition of public spending may be complicated by political factors, including the presence of lobbies in the receiving jurisdiction or area. Assuming the government is welfare-maximising and benevolent, the additional public funds will be directed towards the most growth-enhancing sectors, which are generally identified with productive public expenditure in health, infrastructure, telecommunication, education and R&D. Yet, if the government is not completely benevolent and welfare-maximising, but is instead influenced by special interest groups or other political factors, the additional public funds may be diverted, irrespective of their growth potential. In this setting, the role of institutional quality and the set of limits and controls on the use of additional public funds gains relevance and importance.
The geographical displacement effect
Beside the displacement effect occurring at the composition of investment demand, multi-level government pose also the issue of fund displacement across different geographical areas. The spatial allocation of additional investment may be optimal (in the case of a welfare maximising benevolent planner) or sub-optimal (due to the presence of exogenous constraints or pressure groups), much in the spirit of the issues analyzed in the previous section.
An influential contribution on the effects of public funds (in this case related to infrastructure projects) in a federalist perspective is the paper by Hulten and Schwab (1997) . In their treatment of the provision and financing of public infrastructure in a federalist state, the authors raise an important issue. Since public goods may exert their inter-jurisdictional (or inter-regional) effects, and decision makers will at best be concerned with the welfare of their voters/constituencies, these goods may end up being Moving on to a more general level, the role of political factors in the allocation of EU Structural Funds has been analyzed by Kemmerling and Bodenstein (2006) who consider the role of intergovernmental bargaining or multi-level governance in the distribution of supra-national additional public funds. The two views that are brought together and tested in their paper are the intergovernmental perspective, which stresses the bargaining between national governments, and the multi-level government approach, which considers the role of regional players as well. With a newly constructed dataset on the regional distribution of votes to the European Parliament's parties along with data on the allocation of Structural Funds for the programming period 2000-2006, the role of regional votes is examined. It is shown that regions dominated by parties that are traditionally favourable to regional policies receive relatively more EU funds, due to their lobbying with the national government and directly at the EU level. The main result is related to the finding of a statistically significant link between the regional strength of left-wing parties and the magnitude of incoming additional EU funds.
The role of expenditure spillovers and externalities and the possibility of a "flypaper effect" of additional public funds at the regional level may also affect the allocation between different sub-national units. The areas that can reap the benefits of local public goods may well be outside the boundaries of the local government having official jurisdiction on the investment and spending decisions for that good, leading to the possibility of free riding behaviours.
Several contributions have focused explicitly on regional spillovers of investments in transport and communication. A large number of papers provide grounding to the existence of spatial spillovers of public investment at the regional level, although the exact quantification of the magnitude of these effects is still debated among the academic community (see for example Sloboda and Yao 2008 and Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al. 2008 ). Bronzini and Piselli (2009) In the presence of budgetary constraints for the local, regional governments may alter the response of local expenditure to intergovernmental transfers and grants, as documented by Levaggi and Zanola (2003) for regional health care expenditure in Italy.
The introduction of a soft form of budgetary restrictions (where regions are allowed to incur in some deficit) implies a stronger effect of additional public funds and a slower reaction in terms of local expenditure, providing evidence in favour of a stronger "flypaper effect".
In conclusion, both spatial interactions and spillovers and the presence of budgetary constraints are crucial to estimate the real impact of additionality, since they might affect significantly the response of local public expenditure to the inflow of grants and intergovernmental transfers.
The effect on taxation
Apart from the substitution and displacement effects, additional public investment may determine a fiscal effect in the recipient country. Actually, if the additional funds are uncommitted, taxation could be expected to decrease to a certain extent; on contrary, if the additional euro has to be co-financed, this might lead to an increase in taxation, depending on the co-financing and national accounting rules.
The redistributive implications of EU funds are studied by Doménech et al. (2000) by means of an exogenous growth model with the inclusion of a federal budget and public capital stock in the aggregate production function, estimated with EU budget data. The main result is that, in contrast to other federalist unions (such as the United States or, to a certain extent, Canada), Member States' contributions are directly proportional to national per capita GDP and that the redistributive effect is achieved mainly through the expenditure side (i.e. through EU Structural Funds). By considering the aggregate additional funds received by each
Member State, the estimates show that "on average a 1 percent increase in a country's per capita income decreases the per capita funds it receives from the EU budget by 0.43 percent" (Doménech et al. 2000, p. 646) , and that this redistributive effect has increased over time.
Therefore, following these pieces of evidence, SF are likely to imply no increase in national taxation, since national tax revenues will increase thanks to the improved GDP level.
A further qualification of this statement is related to national fiscal autonomy. Bahr (2008) shows that increasing subnational (i.e. regional) fiscal autonomy (proxied in the empirical analysis by the share of regional tax revenue over the national aggregate) has a positive effect on the growth-enhancing properties of SF. By taking into account decentralization in terms of regional authorities' control over the tax base or tax rate, the author concludes that the effect of EU funds on economic growth is positively related to a decentralized structure. If regions and nations are allowed more fiscal autonomy, their decisions on tax composition and allocation may then be determined optimally. In this sense, if EU funds help in increasing the tax base, and this effect is accentuated in the presence of fiscal decentralization, they indirectly contribute to an optimal tax allocation. In this context, an interesting contribution for the US (Bania and Stone 2008) shows the effect of federal transfers on local tax structures. The main result is that transfers dilute the growth effects of different states' tax structures, a result related to the very nature of federal transfers that are designed to mitigate "the vicious circle of high poverty and welfare needs, low investments in productive services and infrastructure, and low growth" (Bahr 2008, p. 764) .
In a political economy context, transfers and grants from higher levels of government should be allocated according to the income elasticities of the median voter, therefore resulting in lower local taxes (Dahlberg et al. 2008 ). This theoretical prediction has however not been supported by clear and conclusive empirical evidence. Using municipality data for Sweden and examining the effects of grants on local tax decisions and spending, the authors show that grants increase local spending while fail to find a statistically significant effect on the tax rates.
Potential increases in taxation could arise if co-funding rules are in place. In a multi-level government context, Hulten and Schwab (1997) stress the role of tax competition among areas: if national (or higher level government) funding must be co-financed at the local level, a tax increase might become necessary to finance the investment, and this could depress the area's relative competitive edge. This might ultimately lead to a suboptimal level of investment at the local level, reflecting their market and political characteristics.
Lutz (2010) change. The authors first show how, on average, additional public funds do not increase national public spending, implying a crowding out effect on national spending, then conclude that grants may be used indirectly to reduce national deficits.
To sum, even if in principle the flow of additional public funds to national governments can affect both the level and the sectoral composition of taxation, this seems to be an underexplored area in the literature. The main conclusion is that additionality apparently does not affect local taxation directly, but there could be a positive indirect effect on the level of taxation through the redistributive properties of additional public funds. More research is needed to ascertain the compositional effect on national tax structures of additional public funds.
Verification of additionality: the case of the EU
As shown, many factors can distort additional public funds and reduce their full potential effect on economic growth.
Verification of additionality plays a role in ensuring that additional funds are used to effectively complement national expenditure programmes, without being distorted from the use to which they were originally addressed. This Section deals with the case of the EU verification system; its weaknesses are presented and pragmatic improvements are proposed.
Verification procedure in place and its shortcomings
The verification procedure put in place by the European Commission is aimed to ensure that the additionality principle is correctly enforced and that the Member States really use the EU funds as additional to their national investments.
The evaluation of additionality relates to ensuring effective implementation of a programme/project financed with additional external funds. Institutions and agencies, where the principle of additionality is enforced, generally carry out the verification through two different methodological approaches: a country-by-country verification or a standardised verification. The IMF, for example, uses the first method, by establishing a formal spending review exercise with each country receiving its funds. In particular, the Fund carries out a periodic monitoring of how funds have been used, following a procedure that differs by country, depending on the agreement signed with the National Authorities.
On the other side, the European Commission enforces a standard verification procedure for all the Member States which benefit from the Structural Funds. Verification is carried out only in the Convergence Objective regions 10
The ex-ante verification, at the start of the new programming period, sets realistic and sufficiently ambitious targets for public structural expenditure in order to ensure the additionality of Structural Funds. At this stage, the country specifies the targets and the assumptions made about the macroeconomic situation, that have also to be consistent with those included in the stability or convergence programme. As a general rule, the level of expenditure to be maintained should be at least equal to the level of average annual expenditure in real terms in the previous programming period. As stated by the European Commission (2006a), "the objective is to set realistic but sufficiently ambitious targets for structural public expenditure in order to ensure the additional trait of the Structural Funds intervention".
, those which require more growth enhancement efforts, at three times: ex-ante, mid-term and ex-post. Those regular verifications in different stages of the programming are deemed necessary to allow a certain degree of flexibility and adjustments that may be necessary for occurred changes in the economic environment.
The mid-term verification is performed three years after the approval of the programming document 11
Finally, the ex-post verification, at the end of the programming period . The Commission makes an assessment of compliance with additionality requirements and verifies that the level of expenditure agreed ex-ante is at least reached. In consultation with the Member State, the Commission may decide to modify the required level of structural expenditure, if the economic situation significantly changed from the one existing at the moment of the ex-ante verification.
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Member States are required to fill in standard tables, where the annual average spending is indicated for each category of eligible structural expenditure. Despite the fact that additionality is verified at the national level, spending originating not only from the budget of the State, but also of regions and municipalities, as well as public enterprises and public bodies, should be considered.
The additionality principle is considered to be respected ex-ante if the annual average expenditure in the period 2007-13 is equal or higher than the annual average expenditure in the previous period. See for example the results of ex-ante verification carried out by Greece (Table 2) , 10 In EU-27, the Convergence Objective regions include 84 regions within 18 Member States, characterised by per capita GDP at less than 75% of the Community average, and -on a "phasing-out" basis -another 16 regions with a GDP only slightly above the threshold, due to the statistical effect of the larger EU.
. In case of the mid-term or ex-post verification, additionality is respected if the annual average of public eligible expenditure occurred since the start of the programming period has reached the level of expenditure agreed ex-ante, considering 11 For the period 2007-13 it will be carried out in 2011.
12 For the period 2007-13 it will be carried out in 2016. 13 The results show that additionality in Greece was respected at the ex-ante stage.
both the expenditure forecasted in the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and not. Hence, for the principle to be respected, the total of column 13 should be equal or higher than the total of column 7. Source: Hellenic Republic, 2007 Note: For the mid-term and ex-post verification, the Member States should enter in columns 2-7 the annual average expenditure set ex-ante, and in column 8-13 the actual average expenditure occurred in the current period.
From the reports assessing the verification of additionality in the past period (European Commission 2006b , 2009a , On a more realistic ground, the Commission proposed two different policy options for improving the method of verification in future. Both of them would require to combine the verification of the principle with the provision of regular mandatory information submitted by Member States. In the first case, the information to be used for the verification would be linked to the indicator of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) monitored within the context of the Stability Growth Pact (as suggested by Barca, 2009 ). This system would allow to directly link the enforcement of additionality to the macroeconomic cycle; conversely, it is acknowledged that the GFCF does not completely reflect the equivalent structural expenditure eligible to the Structural Funds , it is recognized that the current system of verifying additionality should be fundamentally reviewed. Theoretically, one simple solution to the shortcomings affecting verification could be to reduce the need of monitoring the EU funds allocation, by increasing the co-financing rates, in order to give more responsibility to the Member States. However, the Commission recognised that such an option would be particularly difficult to be pursued from a political point of view and, in the end, it is unfeasible.
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In addition to the policy option selection, another key issue under discussion is how to set the baseline, options being the historical "equivalent structural expenditure" or a percentage of national GDP. In the latter case no mid-term review would be needed since the baseline would automatically adjust to cyclic fluctuations. Moreover, the 27% decrease of the German level of average . In the second case, additionality would be verified by using the information provided under the current Transmission Programme of the European System of Accounts (ESA-95), according to which Member States provide data of public expenditure classified under the COFOG (Classification of the Functions of Government) system. From one side this method would allow to consider a larger number of expenditure categories, to proxy the equivalent structural expenditure, from another one it presents a weakness, i.e. the lack of the direct link with the macroeconomic context. 15 The problems in verifying additionality were presented for the first time in European Commission (2009). 16 In particular the discussion involved representatives of the "Economic and quantitative analysis, additionality unit", of the "Evaluation unit" and of different Member
States. 17 As instance, the GRCF indicator does not include transfers to firms.
annual structural expenditure in 2007, justified by its exceptional spending in the period 2000-06, raises the question of whether the Commission should also consider the absolute figures of public investment, rather than just comparing the actual and past level.
Proposals for a change
We agree with the European Commission that the existing shortcomings in the current verification procedures could be overcome only with a change in the approach. In proposing possible solutions, the results of the literature review of the effects of additionality on the economy of the beneficiaries are taken into account. Actually, to be an effective tool in assessing the enforcement of additionality, verification should not disregard the existence of the distortive effects of additionality. The current verification mechanism, that looks backwards to general past public expenditure trends in order to set a verification benchmark, does not make any real attempt to look more deeply in those expenditures, in order to distinguish among direct and indirect effects of additionality. Hence, such mechanism is unable to deal with the complexity and multidimensionality of the forces at play when additional funds are injected in an economy.
In order to capitalize on the findings of the literature review, the main avenue would be to make the standardised verification procedure currently adopted by the European Commission more similar to a country-by-country survey. This approach could be implemented in two ways. A first method, similar to the one adopted by other international organizations and already existing in some Member States, would be to establish a formal spending review exercise. In the UK, as instance, the spending review has been part of governmental planning since the late 1990s. The reviews set the spending budgets for all areas of Governmental activity, including public services, social security and administration costs 18 . The purpose of this process is to allocate resources across all governmental departments, according to Government's priorities, on a multiannual basis
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A spending review process at EU level would imply a negotiation country-by-country of the targets on Member States' expenditures and of the most suitable monitoring indicators. Yet a spending review is a highly technical task and in the current political and economic circumstance it is not clear whether the European Commission could be empowered with the necessary resources to perform this activity across all the Member States.
, to define key improvements that the public can expect from these resources and to assess whether expenditure programmes comply with their original objectives.
A second method, that would be midway between the current one and a spending review exercise, would be to set additionality targets based no more an aggregate spending levels, but on aggregate and disaggregate targets as ratios of expenditures to GDP as well. Under this method each Member State should ensure to state: (1) a target of overall public spending on a suitable harmonized definition of expenditure; (2) a breakdown of the target by a core set of sectors, such as transport or environment. In this way, while the overall target as percent of the GDP (in PPS Euro) can be considered as an ex-ante promise to sustain public investment (with built-in flexibility for the business cycle), the disaggregated sectoral and possibly regional targets would limit the scope for opportunistic substitution effects.
A default clause for renegotiation under specific circumstances could also be foreseen. Thus, each Member State should ensure the European Commission that, while receiving EU support, public investment (or a wider suitable aggregate of productive government spending) should be not less than a certain percentage of GDP and that public investment in a specific identified sector should be not less than a given percentage of total expenditure. In principle, a regional pattern of expenditure should also be the negotiated target for additionality verification purposes, in order to reduce geographical substitution effects. One possible objection against this second method is that, despite its simplicity, it requires disaggregated data (possibly under the COFOG classification of public expenditure plus regionalized accounts) that currently may be unavailable in most Member States. Thus, a trade-off exists. A country-by-country spending review approach is flexible and can be based on national accounts that, even if not necessarily standardized and comparable across the EU Member States, can be improved and provided in the more suitable form for the specific purpose of setting additionality targets. The possible lack of coherence across countries of public finance accounts is not per se an impediment of a thorough assessment of the specific conditions of a given country. As said above, this approach requires however that the European Commission is provided with the necessary skills, e.g. a team of professionals with the ability to collect, interpret and discuss the existing government statistics in order to lead the preparation of an Additionality
Benchmark to be negotiated between the Commission and the Member States. If the Commission is unable or unwilling to go in that direction, it should be prepared to ask the Member States to provide to Eurostat a standardized set of accounts in order to implement simple accounting rules, which would however be more helpful than the current ones.
Whatever the final decision will be, the risks related to having an inadequate monitoring of public expenditures in the Member States have been sufficiently prominent in the recent financial turmoil in the Euro-zone to suggest that a reconsiderations of the evidence available to the European Commission is necessary. In addition, it has to be considered that the verification linked to official statistics could potentially enable the assessment of the leverage effect of cohesion policy funds on national public expenditures on the whole EU territory, in case a political decision is taken for a verification covering all the EU regions.
Conclusions
Though vastly debated, from different perspectives and theoretical underpinnings there seems to be a broad consensus about the potential positive impact of public spending and additional public funds (either national or supranational, such as the EU funds) on long-run economic growth. However, the actual "net" effect of additional funds on national public spending and ultimately on growth is varied, in consideration that public spending decisions are influenced by a broad range of endogenous and exogenous factors of different nature (namely economic, institutional, political, fiscal): such factors influence the recipient's reaction to additional funds and so the direction and magnitude of their ultimate effect.
In fact, the literature on the substitution effects of additional funds confirms that the freed up funds could be used for other purposes and the total amount of investment does not correspond to the sum of the national planned expenditure and additional external funds. The degree of substitution increases in case of weak institutions and in presence of budgetary restrictions and financial difficulties. The literature review reveals also that worldwide some sectors can be more fungible than others, meaning that investments in certain sectors are likely to be used for other scopes.
The quality of institutions influences also the possibility of fund displacement. Assuming the government is welfaremaximising and benevolent, the additional public funds will be directed towards the most growth-enhancing sectors. Yet, if the government is not completely benevolent, but it is instead influenced by special interest groups or other political factors, the additional public funds may be distorted, irrespective of their growth potential. Besides the displacement effect occurring at the composition of investment demand, multi-level governments pose also the issue of fund displacement across geographical areas, in case that the recipient areas differ from those originally identified as target of the investment.
The theoretical literature suggests also that, even if additionality does not affect local taxation in a direct way, there could be a positive indirect effect on the level of taxation though the redistributive properties of additional public funds.
To sum up, although with some qualifications, the principle of additionality is important in ensuring an impact of the EU Cohesion Policy funds. Injecting EU funds into regional and country economies, in the form of grants, possibly with a leverage effect on other grants and on loan (including private) finance, is potentially a growth-enhancing intervention in the medium-long run. Thus, there is still a clear scope for having a framework of intervention that offers EU funds as additional finance for growth.
ensuring confidence that the growth impact of the funds is maximized. In the operations of verification there is not standard methodology and the information provided are very heterogeneous in terms of quality and usefulness. Moreover, the methodology differs over programming periods and comparability among Member States and planning periods is hampered. Again there are technical difficulties in capturing relevant eligible expenditure, because expenditure are at regional level while verification is at national level. As a consequence, the overall verification of additionality remains an ad hoc exercise which is not part of a regular monitoring system of government accounts and is unable to properly verify where additional funds are allocated.
Given these shortcomings, the authors suggest that the European Commission should move away from the current verification approach, in order to make verification a tool that could contribute to evaluate the overall effects of Structural Funds.
